



# UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE  
United States Patent and Trademark Office  
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS  
P.O. Box 1450  
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450  
www.uspto.gov

| APPLICATION NO. | FILING DATE | FIRST NAMED INVENTOR | ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. | CONFIRMATION NO. |
|-----------------|-------------|----------------------|---------------------|------------------|
| 09/667,625      | 09/22/2000  | Christopher Cressy   | 7784-001023/US      | 8136             |

65961 7590 09/22/2009  
HARNESS DICKEY & PIERCE, PLC  
P.O. BOX 828  
BLOOMFIELD HILLS, MI 48303

|          |
|----------|
| EXAMINER |
|----------|

CZEKAJ, DAVID J

|          |              |
|----------|--------------|
| ART UNIT | PAPER NUMBER |
|----------|--------------|

2621

|           |               |
|-----------|---------------|
| MAIL DATE | DELIVERY MODE |
|-----------|---------------|

09/22/2009

PAPER

**Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.**

The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

---

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS  
AND INTERFERENCES

---

*Ex parte* CHRISTOPHER CRESSY, MICHAEL D. THOMPSON, and  
DOUGLAS H. COX

---

Appeal 2009-005401  
Application 09/667,625<sup>1</sup>  
Technology Center 2600

---

Decided: September 22, 2009

---

Before SCOTT R. BOALICK, THOMAS S. HAHN, and  
ELENI MANTIS MERCADER, *Administrative Patent Judges*.

BOALICK, *Administrative Patent Judge*.

DECISION ON APPEAL

---

<sup>1</sup> Application filed Sept. 22, 2000. Application 09/667,625 claims the benefit under 35 U.S.C. § 119(e) of provisional application 60/155,480, filed Sept. 23, 1999. The real party in interest is The Boeing Company.

This is an appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the final rejection of claims 16-19, 21-43 and 71, all the claims pending in the application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).

We affirm.

### STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Appellants' invention relates to a security alarm monitor that uses a combination of three-dimensional and two-dimensional visualizations to display the status of security devices and allows the operator to respond to alarms. (Abstract.)

Claims 16 and 71 are exemplary:

16. A method of operating a security system comprising:

generating a plurality of video signals corresponding to a respective view from a plurality of cameras;

generating a security device signal with a security device;

when the security device signal is generated, automatically changing a display to a first video signal of the plurality of video signals in response to the security device signal, wherein the display comprises a touch screen; and

displaying an icon of the security device on the display corresponding to an alarm state.

71. A method of operating a security system comprising:

generating a three-dimensional display of an area having a plurality of security devices;

displaying icons of the plurality of security devices on the display, wherein each icon corresponds to a three-dimensional field of view of coverage of the security device wherein said display comprises a touch screen.

The prior art relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the claims on appeal is:

|          |              |  |
|----------|--------------|--|
| Yonezawa | 6,266,082 B1 | July 24, 2001<br>(filed Dec. 18, 1996)   |
| Hobson   | 6,317,152 B1 | Nov. 13, 2001<br>(filed July 17, 1999)   |
| Paff     | 6,665,004 B1 | Dec. 16, 2003<br>(filed May 10, 1995)  |
| Katz     | 7,019,770 B1 | Mar. 28, 2006<br>(filed Mar. 20, 1995)   |
| Box      | 7,194,426 B1 | Mar. 20, 2007<br>(filed Mar. 31, 2000,<br>continuation of<br>application 09/258,714,<br>filed Feb. 26, 1999) |

Claims 16-19, 21-30 and 32-39 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being obvious over Paff and Yonezawa.

Claims 40-42 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being obvious over the combination of Paff, Yonezawa and Katz.

Claim 43 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being obvious over the combination of Paff, Yonezawa and Hobson.

Claim 31 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being obvious over the combination of Paff, Yonezawa and Box.

Claim 71 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being obvious over Yonezawa.

Except as noted in this decision, Appellants have not presented any substantive arguments directed separately to the patentability of the dependent claims or related claims in each group. In the absence of a separate argument with respect to those claims, they stand or fall with the representative independent claim. *See* 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii). Only those arguments actually made by Appellants have been considered in this decision. Arguments that Appellants did not make in the Briefs have not been considered and are deemed to be waived. *See id.*

## ISSUES

With respect to independent claim 16, Appellants argue that the combination of Paff and Yonezawa does not teach or suggest the limitation “when the security device signal is generated, automatically changing a display to a first video signal of the plurality of video signals in response to the security device signal, wherein the display comprises a touch screen.” (App. Br. 6-7; *see also* Reply Br. 2-3.) Appellants further argue that Yonezawa “teaches away” from the features of claim 16 (App. Br. 6-7), that the combination of Paff and Yonezawa is improper, and that Yonezawa’s touch screen “does not display an icon of the security device corresponding to an alarm state” (App. Br. 7).

With respect to dependent claims 18, 21, 24, 27, 28, 30, 31, 33, 35, 37, 38, 42 and 43, Appellants argue that the combination of applied references does not teach or suggest the limitations recited in these claims. (App. Br. 8-12; *see also* Reply Br. 3-8.)

With respect to independent claim 71, Appellants argue that Yonezawa does not teach or suggest “a three-dimensional display of an area

having a plurality of security devices” and “displaying icons of the plurality of security devices on the display, wherein each icon corresponds to a three-dimensional field of view.” (App. Br. 12; *see also* Reply Br. 8.)

Appellants’ arguments present the following issue:

Have Appellants shown that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 16-19, 21-43 and 71 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)?

The resolution of this issue turns on the following subsidiary issues:

1. Have Appellants shown that the Examiner erred in finding that the combination of Paff and Yonezawa teaches or suggests “when the security device signal is generated, automatically changing a display to a first video signal of the plurality of video signals in response to the security device signal, wherein the display comprises a touch screen,” as recited in independent claim 16?

2. Have Appellants shown that the Examiner erred in finding that the combination of Paff and Yonezawa teaches or suggests “wherein the icon corresponds to a security device coverage volume,” as recited in dependent claim 18?

3. Have Appellants shown that the Examiner erred in finding that the combination of Paff and Yonezawa teaches or suggests “wherein in response to touching an icon on the touch screen, directing movement of the display,” as recited in dependent claim 21?

4. Have Appellants shown that the Examiner erred in finding that the combination of Paff and Yonezawa teaches or suggests “wherein the icon is translucent,” as recited in dependent claim 24?

5. Have Appellants shown that the Examiner erred in finding that the combination of Paff and Yonezawa teaches or suggests “wherein the

icon comprises a two-dimensional icon displayed on the two-dimensional display and a three-dimensional icon displayed on the three-dimensional display,” as recited in dependent claim 27?

6. Have Appellants shown that the Examiner erred in finding that the combination of Paff and Yonezawa teaches or suggests “wherein the display comprises a three-dimensional display and a two-dimensional display on separate screens,” as recited in dependent claim 28?

7. Have Appellants shown that the Examiner erred in finding that the combination of Paff and Yonezawa teaches or suggests “wherein displaying an icon on the display corresponding to an alarm state comprises displaying the icon on the display corresponding to the alarm state by changing a material property of the icon,” as recited in dependent claim 30?

8. Have Appellants shown that the Examiner erred in finding that the combination of Paff and Yonezawa teaches or suggests “displaying an alarm priority with the icon,” as recited in dependent claim 33?

9. Have Appellants shown that the Examiner erred in finding that the combination of Paff and Yonezawa teaches or suggests “displaying a tamper status with the icon,” as recited in dependent claim 35?

10. Have Appellants shown that the Examiner erred in finding that the combination of Paff and Yonezawa teaches or suggests “displaying an acknowledged state with the icon,” as recited in dependent claim 37?

11. Have Appellants shown that the Examiner erred in finding that the combination of Paff and Yonezawa teaches or suggests “wherein automatically changing a display to a video signal corresponding to the video device comprises flying in a predetermined manner to a predetermined view of the security device,” as recited in dependent claim 38?

12. Have Appellants shown that the Examiner erred in finding that the combination of Paff, Yonezawa and Katz teaches or suggests “automatically sending hardware commands to other devices in response to the alarm signal,” as recited in dependent claim 42?

13. Have Appellants shown that the Examiner erred in finding that the combination of Paff, Yonezawa and Hobson teaches or suggests “wherein the other devices may comprise a digital video recorder,” as recited in dependent claim 43?

14. Have Appellants shown that the Examiner erred in finding that the combination of Paff, Yonezawa and Box teaches or suggests “wherein displaying an icon on the display corresponding to an alarm state comprises displaying the icon on the display corresponding to the alarm state by changing an animation of the icon,” as recited in dependent claim 31?

15. Have Appellants shown that the Examiner erred in finding that Yonezawa teaches or suggests “a three-dimensional display of an area having a plurality of security devices” and “displaying icons of the plurality of security devices on the display, wherein each icon corresponds to a three-dimensional field of view,” as recited in independent claim 71?

16. Have Appellants shown that the Examiner erred by improperly combining the applied references?

## FINDINGS OF FACT

The record supports the following findings of fact (FF) by a preponderance of the evidence.

### *Paff*

1. Paff relates to a security system that includes “a graphical control unit through which an operator can easily control the various security functions of the security system.” (Col. 1, ll. 11-14; Fig. 1.) A security system 9 includes a graphical control unit (GCU) 1 that communicates between security devices, such as video cassette recorders (VCRS) 4, output devices 5, sensors 6, CCTV cameras 7, and access control devices 8. (Col. 5, ll. 12-20.) Examples of access control devices 8 include “cardreaders, proximity sensors and keypads.” (Col. 6, ll. 23-24.) Examples of sensors 6 include “motion detectors, intrusion detectors and door switches.” (Col. 6, ll. 26-27.)
2. The GCU 1 displays a combination of graphical and video images on a display unit 3 for effective management of the security devices. (Col. 5, ll. 19-24.) Input devices 2 (e.g., keyboard and hand-held mouse) are connected to the GCU 1 to permit an operator to enter information. (Col. 5, ll. 29-31.) The video images displayed on the display unit 3 are transmitted from selected CCTV cameras 7. (Col. 5, ll. 27-28.)
3. The display unit 3 can also display a graphical image of the floor plan 30 of a protected premise. (Col. 6, ll. 37-39; Fig. 3.) Icons of

- security devices are displayed on the floor plan 30 (col. 6, ll. 39-46). Examples of such icons include a programmable dome icon 31 (col. 7, ll. 34-38; Fig. 5), a target icon 40 (col. 8, ll. 29-32; Fig. 5), a motion input icon 35 (col. 9, ll. 35-47; Fig. 5) and a card reader icon 33 (col. 9, ll. 48-51; Fig. 5). The operator can manipulate the security devices on the floor plan 30 by using the mouse (i.e., clicking on the mouse key) to select the corresponding icon. (Col. 6, ll. 46-50.)
4. The programmable dome icon 31 “represents an enhanced CCTV domed camera device that is capable of 360° pan; 90° tilt, zoom and focus control, and has the ability to electronically determine its pan, tilt, zoom and focus position.” (Col. 7, ll. 34-38; Fig. 5.) The programmable dome icon 31 includes “a pan/tilt direction icon segment 31PT which is a cone shaped extension which indicates the pan direction and the tilt position of the programmable dome camera.” (Col. 7, ll. 47-50; Fig. 5.) Figures 3 and 4 illustrate a circle surrounding each of the programmable dome icons 31 and that the pan/tilt direction icon segment 31PT is shaded.
  5. The GCU 1 is configured to generate a specific response based on the signals generated by the sensors 6. (Col. 14, ll. 35-38.) “The GCU 1 can react in many ways including, calling-up a specific camera or dome, calling-up a target or pattern associated with a programmable dome, displaying the video on a specific monitor, [or] turning on a VCR to record the event.” (Col. 14, ll. 42-46.)

6. The motion input icon 35 “represents an intrusion sensing device (such as a motion detector) and is displayed in three forms based on its status.” (Col. 9, ll. 35-37.) For the “Normal” status, in which the device is inactive and has not been tripped, the motion input icon 35 is green and displays a “standing man.” (Col. 9, ll. 37-39; Fig. 5.) For the “Tripped+Active” status, in which the device is active and has been tripped, the motion input icon 35TA is red and displays a “running man.” (Col. 9, ll. 39-41; Fig. 5.) For the “Tripped+Not Active” status, in which the device is inactive but has been tripped, the motion input icon 35NA is red and displays a “standing man.” (Col. 9, ll. 41-43; Fig. 5.) For the “Tripped+Not Active” status, the operator can enter a description of an alarm event in a text window and reset the device to “Normal” status. (Col. 9, ll. 43-47.)
7. The card reader icon 33 “represents an access control device that electronically ‘reads’ an identification card . . . to allow or deny access.” (Col. 9, ll. 48-50; Fig. 5.) For the “Normal” status, in which no “exception events” are pending, the card reader icon 33 is green. (Col. 9, ll. 53-55.) For the “Tripped” status, in which “exception events” are pending, the card reader icon 33 is red. (Col. 9, ll. 55-56; Fig. 5.) Examples of an “exception event” are “someone trying to gain access to an unauthorized area or someone trying to use a card that has been reported lost or stolen.” (Col. 9, ll. 56-59.)
8. The target icon 30 “represents a specific, static (fixed) view defined by one pan, tilt, zoom and focus position of a programmable

dome 31.” (Col. 8, ll. 30-32.) For “quickly and accurately” accessing the target, the operator clicks on the target icon 30 to “switch[] the video from the camera in the associated programmable dome to the display unit 3.” (Col. 8, ll. 43-47.)

*Yonezawa*

9. Yonezawa relates to a communication apparatus composed of several video cameras and an apparatus to process the images generated by the cameras. (Col. 1, ll. 8-11.) The communication apparatus uses a graphical user interface to facilitate control over multiple cameras. (Col. 1, ll. 31-45.)
10. Yonezawa describes a computer terminal 10 for controlling the communication apparatus that receives instructions from an operator using a mouse 28 or a touch panel on a display 35. (Col. 4, ll. 26-32; col. 5, ll. 21-25; Fig. 1.) Figure 3 illustrates a map window 500 including multiple maps 510 to 540 “each indicating a layout of an office, a shop, or a warehouse.” (Col. 5, ll. 61-64; Fig. 3.) Figure 5 illustrates a video display window 600 with video display areas 610 to 620. The map window 500 and the video display window 600 “may be displayed on a same screen or may be displayed on separate screens, i.e., on separate monitor units.” (Col. 6, ll. 19-23.)
11. In one embodiment, the map 520 includes camera icons 521 to 524. (Col. 6, ll. 3-6; Fig. 3.) A “moving picture” corresponding to the camera icons 521 to 524 can be “dragged and dropped” in any one of

video display areas 610 to 620. (Col. 6, ll. 35-42; Fig. 6.) For example, the camera icon 523 can be “dragged and dropped” to a video display area 614 to display “a moving picture from a camera corresponding to the icon.” (Col. 6, ll. 37-43; Fig. 6.) The window 600 includes a three-dimensional garbage can icon 632 for deleting a displayed video area. (Col. 6, ll. 23-25; Fig. 5.) Figure 6 illustrates a three-dimensional “moving picture” in the video display area 614 corresponding to the camera icon 523. Figure 8 illustrates that the “moving picture” has been “dragged and dropped” to a video display area 612 from the video display area 614.

*Box*

12. Box relates to an Internet-based graphical user interface (col. 1, ll. 12-14, 25-27) used as “an electronic conduit for business to government transactions” (col. 1, ll. 24-25). In one embodiment, Box describes creating real-time, dynamic Web pages including animated icons. (Col. 7, ll. 59-67.)

*Hobson*

13. Hobson relates to “video recording, and more particularly, to a digital video recording system for use at Point of Sale (POS) locations, Automated Teller Machines (ATM’s [sic]), and other locations where the monitoring of activities is important.” (Col. 1, ll. 12-16.) Hobson describes that as a result of repeated use of video tapes, “the recorded image is degraded and vital information may be lost or rendered incomprehensible.” (Col. 3, ll. 38-41.) Hobson further describes a

digital video recording system 10 for an ATM machine. (Col. 3, ll. 42-43; Fig. 3.)

*Katz*

14. Katz relates to “a videophone system for monitoring remote locations from a central unit for use in a variety of applications, such as for security.” (Col. 1, ll. 20-23.) In one embodiment, Katz describes the use of detectors at remote locations that “provide distinctive or unique audio tones recognized by the central units . . . in the event [of] fraudulent replacement of telephones.” (Col. 6, ll. 58-61.)

PRINCIPLES OF LAW

On appeal, all timely filed evidence and properly presented arguments are considered by the Board. *See In re Piasecki*, 745 F.2d 1468, 1472 (Fed. Cir. 1984).

“Section 103 forbids issuance of a patent when ‘the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.’” *KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.*, 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). In *KSR*, the Supreme Court emphasized “the need for caution in granting a patent based on the combination of elements found in the prior art,” *id.* at 415, and discussed circumstances in which a patent might be determined to be obvious. In particular, the Supreme Court emphasized that “[t]he combination of familiar elements according to known methods is

likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results.” *Id.* at 416. The Court explained:

When a work is available in one field of endeavor, design incentives and other market forces can prompt variations of it, either in the same field or a different one. If a person of ordinary skill can implement a predictable variation, § 103 likely bars its patentability. For the same reason, if a technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill.

*Id.* at 417.

## ANALYSIS

We do not find Appellants’ arguments that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 16-19, 21-43 and 71 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) to have merit.

### *Claims 16-19, 21-30 and 32-39*

#### Claim 16

Appellants’ arguments (App. Br. 6-7; *see also* Reply Br. 2-3) that the combination of Paff and Yonezawa does not teach or suggest the limitation “when the security device signal is generated, automatically changing a display to a first video signal of the plurality of video signals in response to the security device signal, wherein the display comprises a touch screen,” as recited in claim 16, are not persuasive.

The Examiner found that Paff teaches all the limitations of claim 16 (Ans. 3) except for the limitation “wherein the display comprises a touch screen.” (Ans. 3-4). The Examiner cited Yonezawa for the disclosure of a touch screen. (Ans. 3-4.) The Examiner concluded that it would have been

obvious to modify Paff with the touch screen of Yonezawa “in order to provide a user with an efficient and friendly interface for implementing camera controls.” (Ans. 4.) While we agree with the Examiner, we add the following primarily for emphasis and clarification.

Paff teaches a graphical control unit (GCU) 1 for a security control system to control multiple CCTV cameras 7. (FF 1.) The GCU 1 generates a specific response based on the signals detected by a sensor 6, including “calling-up a specific camera . . . [and] displaying the video on a specific monitor.” (FF 5.) Thus, Paff expressly teaches the limitation “when the security device signal is generated, automatically changing a display to a first video signal of the plurality of video signals in response to the security device signal,” as recited in claim 16.

Paff relates to a GCU 1 for a security control system in which an operator can input information using a hand-held mouse. (FF 1-2.) Yonezawa teaches a computer terminal 10 for controlling multiple video cameras in which an operator enters instructions using either a mouse 28 or a touch panel on a display 35. (FF 10.) Combining Paff with Yonezawa is no more than the simple substitution of Yonezawa’s known method of entering instructions using a touch panel for Paff’s known method of inputting information using a hand-held mouse, with predictable results. *See KSR*, 550 U.S. at 417. Appellants have not presented any convincing arguments or evidence that the Examiner erred in combining Paff with Yonezawa.

Appellants’ argument (App. Br. 6-7) that Yonezawa “teaches away” from the features of claim 16 is not persuasive. In particular, Appellants argue that Yonezawa “appears to be referring to the need for the observer to rearrange the video display” rather than disclosing the limitation “when the

security device signal is generated, automatically changing a display to a first video signal of the plurality of video signals in response to the security device signal, wherein the display comprises a touch screen,” as recited in claim 16. (App. Br. 6.) However, as discussed above, the combination of Paff and Yonezawa teaches this limitation.

Appellants’ argument (App. Br. 7) that Yonezawa’s touch screen “does not display an icon of the security device corresponding to an alarm state” is not persuasive. The Examiner cited Paff rather than Yonezawa for the disclosure of this claim feature. (Ans. 3; FF 6.)

Therefore, Appellants have not shown that the Examiner erred in combining the applied references or in finding that the combination of Paff and Yonezawa teaches or suggests “when the security device signal is generated, automatically changing a display to a first video signal of the plurality of video signals in response to the security device signal, wherein the display comprises a touch screen,” as recited in claim 16.

Dependent claims 17, 19, 22, 23, 25, 26, 29, 32, 34, 36 and 39 were not argued separately (App. Br. 8-11), and fall with claim 16 from which they depend.

### Claim 18

Appellants’ arguments (App. Br. 8; *see also* Reply Br. 3) that the combination of Paff and Yonezawa does not teach or suggest the limitation “wherein the icon corresponds to a security device coverage volume,” as recited in dependent claim 18, are not persuasive.

The Examiner found that Paff teaches “a security device coverage volume” because Figures 4 and 5 of Paff illustrate “camera icons that show

the device coverage area” and “each icon also has a pan/tilt direction icon segment 31 PT which indicates the pan and tilt position of the camera.”

(Ans. 11.) We generally agree with the Examiner.

Paff teaches that each CCTV camera 7 “is capable of 360° pan; 90° tilt, zoom and focus control.” (FF 4.) Furthermore, the circle surrounding each of the programmable dome icons 31 in Figures 3 and 4 of Paff suggests each camera’s viewing radius. (See FF 4.) Thus, based on each camera’s 360° pan, 90° tilt and viewing radius, one of ordinary skill in the art could calculate “a security device coverage volume.” Although Appellants argue that “Figure 5 [of Paff] merely shows two-dimensional icons and not three-dimensional icons” (App. Br. 8), the feature of “three-dimensional icons” is not claimed.

Therefore, Appellants have not shown that the Examiner erred in finding that the combination of Paff and Yonezawa teaches or suggests “wherein the icon corresponds to a security device coverage volume,” as recited in claim 18.

### Claim 21

Appellants’ arguments (App. Br. 8; *see also* Reply Br. 3) that the combination of Paff and Yonezawa does not teach or suggest the limitation “wherein in response to touching an icon on the touch screen, directing movement of the display,” as recited in dependent claim 21, are not persuasive.

The Examiner found that Paff teaches operating a mouse to manipulate a security device icon (Ans. 4, 11; FF 3), and Yonezawa teaches a touch panel for inputting instructions to a computer terminal (Ans. 4, 11;

FF 10). The Examiner concluded that “[b]y using a touch screen display, a user must ‘touch’ the display to activate certain functions.” (Ans. 11.) We agree with the Examiner.

As discussed above regarding claim 16, combining Paff with Yonezawa is no more than the simple substitution of one known element for another, with predictable results. *See KSR*, 550 U.S. at 417. A substitution of Yonezawa’s touch panel for Paff’s mouse would include directing movement of an icon by “touching an icon on the touch screen” instead of manipulating the icon with a mouse.

Therefore, Appellants have not shown that the Examiner erred in finding that the combination of Paff and Yonezawa teaches or suggests “wherein in response to touching an icon on the touch screen, directing movement of the display,” as recited in claim 21.

#### Claim 24

Appellants’ arguments (App. Br. 8-9; *see also* Reply Br. 3-4) that the combination of Paff and Yonezawa does not teach or suggest the limitation “wherein the icon is translucent,” as recited in dependent claim 24, are not persuasive.

The Examiner found that the programmable dome icon 31 in Figures 3 and 4 is “translucent” because the walls of the floor plan 30 can be viewed through the icon. (Ans. 5, 11.)

Under the broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the Specification, we agree with the Examiner that Paff teaches the limitation “wherein the icon is translucent.” Appellants argue that the programmable dome icons 31 in Figure 4 and 5 of Paff “appear to be transparent not

translucent.” (App. Br. 8; *see also* Reply Br. 3.) However, a relevant plain meaning of “translucent” is “transparent.” *Webster’s Third New International Dictionary* 2429 (1993). Thus, we find the Examiner’s construction of “translucent” to be reasonable. Appellants have not pointed to any special definition of “translucent” in the Specification that would require a different interpretation.

Even if Appellants are correct in that “translucent” must be interpreted as “not transparent” but only “allowing light to pass through” (Reply Br. 4), Figures 3 and 4 of Paff illustrate that the pan/tilt direction icon segment 31PT is shaded (*see* FF 4), i.e., it allows light to pass through and thus is “translucent” under the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claim.

Therefore, Appellants have not shown that the Examiner erred in finding that the combination of Paff and Yonezawa teaches or suggests “wherein the icon is translucent,” as recited in claim 24.

#### Claim 27

Appellants’ arguments (App. Br. 9; *see also* Reply Br. 4) that the combination of Paff and Yonezawa does not teach or suggest the limitation “wherein the icon comprises a two-dimensional icon displayed on the two-dimensional display and a three-dimensional icon displayed on the three-dimensional display,” as recited in dependent claim 27, are not persuasive.

The Examiner found that a garbage can icon 632 on a map window 600 of Yonezawa corresponds to “a three-dimensional icon displayed on the three-dimensional display.” (Ans. 5, 11-12; FF 10-11.) We agree with the Examiner.

Appellants argue that even if the garbage can icon 632 “is considered a three dimensional icon [it] is not displayed on a three dimensional display.” (Reply Br. 4.) However, Yonezawa’s Figure 8 illustrates a three-dimensional video display area 612 that corresponds to a camera icon 523. (FF 11.) The window 600 also includes the three-dimensional garbage can icon 632. (*Id.*) Thus, under the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claim, Figure 8 of Yonezawa teaches “a three-dimensional icon displayed on the three-dimensional display.”

Therefore, Appellants have not shown that the Examiner erred in finding that the combination of Paff and Yonezawa teaches or suggests “wherein the icon comprises a two-dimensional icon displayed on the two-dimensional display and a three-dimensional icon displayed on the three-dimensional display,” as recited in claim 27.

#### Claim 28

Appellants’ arguments (App. Br. 9; *see also* Reply Br. 4-5) that the combination of Paff and Yonezawa does not teach or suggest the limitation “wherein the display comprises a three-dimensional display and a two-dimensional display on separate screens,” as recited in dependent claim 28, are not persuasive.

The Examiner found that Figure 8 of Yonezawa illustrates “a three-dimensional display and a two-dimensional display on separate screens.” (Ans. 5, 12; FF 10.) We agree with the Examiner.

Appellants argue that “Yonezawa fails to disclose a three-dimensional display and a two-dimensional display on separate screens” (Reply Br. 4) because the “[w]indow 600 is merely described as having a video display

area which . . . is not a three-dimensional display” (Reply Br. 4-5.)

However, Yonezawa teaches that the map window 500 and the video display window 600 “may be displayed on a same screen or may be displayed on separate screens.” (FF 10.) As discussed above regarding claim 27, Figure 8 of Yonezawa teaches “the three-dimensional display” because the video display area 612 is a three-dimensional video. (FF 11.)

Therefore, Appellants have not shown that the Examiner erred in finding that the combination of Paff and Yonezawa teaches or suggests “wherein the display comprises a three-dimensional display and a two-dimensional display on separate screens,” as recited in claim 28.

### Claim 30

Appellants’ arguments (App. Br. 9; *see also* Reply Br. 5) that the combination of Paff and Yonezawa does not teach or suggest the limitation “wherein displaying an icon on the display corresponding to an alarm state comprises displaying the icon on the display corresponding to the alarm state by changing a material property of the icon,” as recited in dependent claim 30, are not persuasive.

The Examiner found that Paff teaches “displaying the icon on the display corresponding to the alarm state by changing a material property of the icon” because the motion input icon 35 changes color depending upon alarm status. (Ans. 5, 12; FF 6.)

Under the broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the Specification, we agree with the Examiner that the color of the motion input icon 35 is a “material property.” Appellants argue that “a material property is different than color as used in the present disclosure” because the

Specification enumerates “material property” separately from “color” in describing security device status. (Reply Br. 5.) However, a relevant plain meaning of “property” is “a quality or trait belonging to a person or thing.” *Webster’s Third New International Dictionary* 1818 (1993). Thus, we find the Examiner’s construction of “material property” to be reasonable. Appellants have not pointed to any special definition of “material property” in the Specification that would require a different interpretation.

Furthermore, even if Appellants are correct in that color is not a “material property,” Paff teaches that the motion input icon 35 displays either a “standing man” or a “running man” (i.e., a change in “material property”) depending upon the alarm status (FF 6).

Therefore, Appellants have not shown that the Examiner erred in finding that the combination of Paff and Yonezawa teaches or suggests “wherein displaying an icon on the display corresponding to an alarm state comprises displaying the icon on the display corresponding to the alarm state by changing a material property of the icon,” as recited in claim 30.

### Claim 33

Appellants’ arguments (App. Br. 10; *see also* Reply Br. 5) that the combination of Paff and Yonezawa does not teach or suggest “displaying an alarm priority with the icon,” as recited in dependent claim 33, are not persuasive.

The Examiner found that Paff teaches “displaying an alarm priority with the icon” because the motion input sensor 35 displays either a “standing man” or a “running man” that changes color depending upon alarm status. (Ans. 6, 12; FF 6.) We agree with the Examiner.

Appellants argue that “the color has no relation to priority” for the motion input sensor 35 (App. Br. 10) and “there is no indication of a priority of this alarm versus any other alarm” (Reply Br. 5). However, Paff teaches that the motion input icon 35 can either have a “Normal” status in which the motion input icon 35 is green; or a “Tripped+Active” status in which the motion input icon 35TA is red. (FF 6.) In other words, an operator would prioritize the red motion input icon 35TA over the green motion input icon 35. (*See id.*) Although Appellants attempt to distinguish claim 33 over Paff by emphasizing that “there is no indication of a priority of this alarm versus any other alarm” (Reply Br. 5), this feature is not claimed.

Therefore, Appellants have not shown that the Examiner erred in finding that the combination of Paff and Yonezawa teaches or suggests “displaying an alarm priority with the icon,” as recited in claim 33.

### Claim 35

Appellants’ arguments (App. Br. 10; *see also* Reply Br. 5-6) that the combination of Paff and Yonezawa does not teach or suggest the limitation “displaying a tamper status with the icon,” as recited in dependent claim 35, are not persuasive.

The Examiner found that Paff teaches “displaying a tamper status with the icon” because the motion input icon 35 changes color depending upon alarm status. (Ans. 6, 13.)

Under the broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the Specification, we agree with the Examiner that Paff teaches the limitation of “displaying a tamper status with the icon.” Appellants argue that “[t]apering [sic] is different than activating the alarms.” (App. Br. 10). However, a

relevant plain meaning of “tamper” is “to interfere so as to weaken or change for the worse.” *Webster’s Third New International Dictionary* 2336 (1993). Also, the term “tamper status” does not specify precisely what is being tampered with. Thus, under the broadest reasonable interpretation, a tripped motion input icon 35 indicates a status of interference with the protected premise so as to weaken its overall security or change it for the worse – in other words, a tamper status. (*See* FF 3, 6.) We find the Examiner’s construction of “tamper” to be reasonable. Appellants have not pointed to any special definition of “tamper” in the Specification that would require a different interpretation.

Furthermore, even if Appellants are correct in that “[t]ampering [sic] is different than activating the alarms” (App. Br. 10), Paff teaches that a card reader icon 33 displays a “Tripped” status for “someone trying to use a card that has been reported lost or stolen” (FF 7). In other words, when the card reader icon 33 displays a “Tripped” status, it is indicating a “tamper status.” (*See id.*)

Therefore, Appellants have not shown that the Examiner erred in finding that the combination of Paff and Yonezawa teaches or suggests “displaying a tamper status with the icon,” as recited in claim 35.

### Claim 37

Appellants’ arguments (App. Br. 10; *see also* Reply Br. 6) that the combination of Paff and Yonezawa does not teach or suggest the limitation “displaying an acknowledged state with the icon,” as recited in dependent claim 37, are not persuasive.

Under the broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the Specification, we find that Paff teaches the limitation “displaying an acknowledged state with the icon.” A relevant plain meaning of “acknowledge” is “to take notice of.” *Webster’s Third New International Dictionary* 17 (1993). Paff teaches that one status for the motion input icon 35 is “Tripped+Not Active.” (FF 6.) When this occurs, the operator can enter a description of an alarm event in a text window and reset the device to “Normal” status. (*Id.*) In other words, the operator acknowledges or takes notice of the motion input icon 35 being tripped. (*See id.*)

Therefore, Appellants have not shown that the Examiner erred in finding that the combination of Paff and Yonezawa teaches or suggests “displaying an acknowledged state with the icon,” as recited in claim 37.

#### Claim 38

Appellants’ arguments (App. Br. 10-11; *see also* Reply Br. 6-7) that the combination of Paff and Yonezawa does not teach or suggest the limitation “wherein automatically changing a display to a video signal corresponding to the video device comprises flying in a predetermined manner to a predetermined view of the security device,” as recited in dependent claim 38, are not persuasive.

The Examiner found that Paff teaches “flying in a predetermined manner to a predetermined view of the security device” because an operator can quickly zoom and focus on a target icon 30, such that “a flying effect would be seen on the screen by the user.” (Ans. 6, 13; FF 8.)

Under the broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the Specification, we agree with the Examiner that Paff teaches the limitation of

“flying in a predetermined manner to a predetermined view of the security device.” Appellants argue that “[i]n a flying state it is clear that the actual position of the camera is moved and not merely panning, tilting and moving from a fixed or static position” (App. Br. 10) such that “the system operator has a perspective of the security device and the area covered by the security device” (Reply Br. 7). However, a relevant plain meaning of “flying” is “intended for rapid movement or action.” *Webster’s Third New International Dictionary* 879-80 (1993). Paff teaches that an operator can “quickly and accurately” access video of a specific target by clicking on a target icon 30 such that the programmable dome 31 (movable camera) automatically pans, tilts, zooms and focuses on the target. (FF 8.) In other words, the programmable dome 31 can be characterized as “flying” (or “intended for rapid movement”) to obtain a video image of the target. (*See id.*) Thus, we find the Examiner’s construction of “flying” to be reasonable. Appellants have not pointed to any special definition of “flying” in the Specification that would require a different interpretation. Although Appellants attempt to distinguish claim 38 over Paff by emphasizing that “the actual position of the camera is moved” (App. Br. 10) and providing “a perspective of the security device and the area covered by the security device” (Reply Br. 7), these features are not claimed.

Therefore, Appellants have not shown that the Examiner erred in finding that the combination of Paff and Yonezawa teaches or suggests “wherein automatically changing a display to a video signal corresponding to the video device comprises flying in a predetermined manner to a predetermined view of the security device,” as recited in claim 38.

In summary, we conclude that Appellants have not shown that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 16-19, 21-30 and 32-39 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).

*Claims 40-42*

Appellants' arguments (App. Br. 11; *see also* Reply Br. 7) that the combination of Paff, Yonezawa and Katz does not teach or suggest the limitation "automatically sending hardware commands to other devices in response to the alarm signal," as recited in claim 42, are not persuasive.

The Examiner found that Paff teaches "automatically sending hardware commands to other devices in response to the alarm signal." (Ans. 7, 13-14; FF 5.) We agree with the Examiner.

Paff teaches a graphical control unit (GCU) 1 for a security control system for controlling multiple CCTV cameras 7. (FF 1.) The GCU 1 generates a specific response based on the signals detected by a sensor 6, including "turning on a VCR to record the event." (FF 5.) Thus, Paff expressly teaches the limitation "automatically sending hardware commands to other devices in response to the alarm signal," as recited in claim 42.

Katz was cited by the Examiner for teaching the use of distinctive or unique audio tones to prevent fraudulent replacement of telephones for a videophone security system. (Ans. 7; FF 14.) The Examiner articulated a reason with rational underpinnings to combine the teachings of Katz with Paff and Yonezawa, and Appellants have not presented any convincing argument or evidence that the Examiner erred in making this combination.

Therefore, Appellants have not shown that the Examiner erred in finding that the combination of Paff, Yonezawa and Katz teaches or suggests

“automatically sending hardware commands to other devices in response to the alarm signal,” as recited in claim 42.

We conclude that Appellants have not shown that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 42 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).

Appellants acknowledged that claims 40 and 41 stand or fall together with claim 39. (App. Br. 11.) Thus, claims 40 and 41 fall together with claim 39.

### *Claim 43*

Appellants’ arguments (App. Br. 11; *see also* Reply Br. 7) that the combination of Paff, Yonezawa and Hobson does not teach or suggest the limitation “wherein the other devices may comprise a digital video recorder,” as recited in claim 43, are not persuasive.

The Examiner acknowledged that the combination of Paff and Yonezawa does not teach or suggest the limitation “wherein the other devices may comprise a digital video recorder,” as recited in dependent claim 43 (Ans. 7-8), and the Examiner cited Hobson for the disclosure of a digital video recording system (Ans. 8; FF 13). We agree with the Examiner.

Paff teaches a graphical control unit (GCU) 1 for a security control system to control multiple CCTV cameras 7. (FF 1.) The GCU 1 generates a specific response based on the signals detected by a sensor 6, including “turning on a VCR to record the event.” (FF 5.) Yonezawa teaches a graphical user interface for controlling video cameras that displays maps, video and camera icons. (FF 9-11.) Hobson relates to “a digital video recording system” for monitoring an ATM machine. (FF 13.) Combining

Hobson with Paff and Yonezawa is no more than the simple substitution of Hobson's known digital video recording system for Paff's known video cassette recorder, with predictable results. *See KSR*, 550 U.S. at 417.

Appellants have not presented any convincing arguments or evidence that the Examiner erred in combining Hobson with Paff and Yonezawa.

Appellants' arguments that "no teaching or suggestion is provided [in Hobson] for automatically sending hardware commands to other devices in response to an alarm signal, wherein the other devices include a digital video recorder" (App. Br. 11) and "Paff . . . does not include automatically sending hardware commands to . . . a digital video recorder," (Reply Br. 7) lack merit. As discussed above, Paff teaches "automatically sending hardware commands to other devices in response to the alarm signal" (FF 5), and Hobson teaches "a digital video recorder" (FF 13).

Therefore, Appellants have not shown that the Examiner erred in finding that the combination of Paff, Yonezawa and Hobson teaches or suggests "wherein the other devices may comprise a digital video recorder," as recited in claim 43.

We conclude that Appellants have not shown that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 43 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).

### *Claim 31*

Appellants' arguments (App. Br. 12; *see also* Reply Br. 7-8) that the combination of Paff, Yonezawa and Box does not teach or suggest the limitation "wherein displaying an icon on the display corresponding to an alarm state comprises displaying the icon on the display corresponding to the

alarm state by changing an animation of the icon,” as recited in claim 31, are not persuasive.

The Examiner acknowledged that the combination of Paff and Yonezawa does not teach or suggest the limitation “changing an animation of the icon” and cited Box for the disclosure of animated icons. (Ans. 8, 14.) We agree with the Examiner.

Paff relates to a graphical control unit (GCU) 1 for a security system that displays graphical images, video images and icons of security devices on a display unit 3 (FF 1-3). Yonezawa relates to a graphical user interface for controlling video cameras that displays maps, video and camera icons (FF 9-11). Box relates to an Internet-based graphical user interface that includes creating dynamic, real-time Web pages with animated icons. (FF 12.) Modifying Paff and Yonezawa to animate the security device icons as taught by Box would have been obvious because a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that Box’s animated icon would improve the security device icons in the same way as the prior art, with predictable results. *See KSR*, 550 U.S. at 417. Appellants have not presented any convincing arguments or evidence that the Examiner erred in combining Box with Paff and Yonezawa.

Therefore, Appellants have not shown that the Examiner erred in finding that the combination of Paff, Yonezawa and Box teaches or suggests “wherein displaying an icon on the display corresponding to an alarm state comprises displaying the icon on the display corresponding to the alarm state by changing an animation of the icon,” as recited in claim 31.

We conclude that Appellants have not shown that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 31 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).

*Claim 71*

Appellants' arguments (App. Br. 12; *see also* Reply Br. 8) that Yonezawa does not teach or suggest "a three-dimensional display of an area having a plurality of security devices" and "displaying icons of the plurality of security devices on the display, wherein each icon corresponds to a three-dimensional field of view," as recited in claim 71, are not persuasive.

The Examiner found that Figure 8 of Yonezawa teaches "a three-dimensional display of an area having a plurality of security devices" and "displaying icons of the plurality of security devices on the display, wherein each icon corresponds to a three-dimensional field of view." (Ans. 9, 14-15.) We agree with the Examiner.

Yonezawa teaches that in Figure 8, a three-dimensional "moving picture" corresponding to a camera icon 523 is displayed in a video display area 614. (FF 11.) Yonezawa also teaches that the video from the camera icons 521 to 524 can be displayed in any of the video display areas 610 to 620. (*Id.*) Thus, Yonezawa teaches "a three-dimensional display of an area having a plurality of security devices" and "displaying icons of the plurality of security devices on the display, wherein each icon corresponds to a three-dimensional field of view," as recited in claim 71.

Appellants' arguments (App. Br. 12) that Yonezawa does not teach or suggest that "each icon corresponds to a three-dimensional field of view" lack merit. In particular, Appellants argue that the "field of view" for the camera icon 523 is represented by the "two-dimensional pie-shaped piece" of Figure 8 and does not represent a volume. (Reply Br. 8.) However, as discussed above, a three-dimensional "moving picture" corresponding to the camera icon 523 is displayed in the video display area 612. Although

Appellants attempt to distinguish claim 71 over Yonezawa by emphasizing that Yonezawa does not teach or suggest “a three-dimensional field of view of the security device” (App. Br. 12), this feature is not claimed.

Therefore, Appellants have not shown that the Examiner erred in finding that Yonezawa teaches or suggests “a three-dimensional display of an area having a plurality of security devices” and “displaying icons of the plurality of security devices on the display, wherein each icon corresponds to a three-dimensional field of view,” as recited in claim 71.

We conclude that Appellants have not shown that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 71 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).

### CONCLUSION

Based on the findings of facts and analysis above, we conclude that Appellants have not shown that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 16-19, 21-43 and 71 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).

### DECISION

The rejection of claims 16-19, 21-43 and 71 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) is affirmed.

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED

Appeal 2009-005401  
Application 09/667,625

bim

HARNESS, DICKEY & PIERCE, PLC  
P.O. BOX 828  
BLOOMFIELD HILLS, MI 48303